To study how people interact with these spreadsheets in case they are leaked, we posted unique links pointing to the spreadsheets on a popular paste site. Each spreadsheet was configured to report details of accesses and clicks on links back to us. We populated 5 Google spreadsheets with fake bank account details and fake funds transfer links. In this paper, we present a system able to monitor user activity on Google spreadsheets. Despite the importance of such documents to Internet users, there are still large gaps in the understanding of what cybercriminals do when they illicitly get access to them by for example compromising the account credentials they are associated with. We conclude this paper by making recommendations on clarifying the privacy implications of internal site search to end users.Ĭloud-based documents are inherently valuable, due to the volume and nature of sensitive personal and business content stored in them.

We then present a few countermeasures, including a browser extension to warn users about imminent search term leakage to third parties. However, about 75% of these privacy policies seem to mention the sharing of some information with third-parties in a generic manner. We then compared our results to the expected results based on a natural language analysis of the privacy policies of those leaking websites (where available) and found that about 87% of those privacy policies do not mention search terms explicitly. We found that 81.3% of websites containing internal site search sent (or leaked from a user’s perspective) our search terms to third parties in some form. Our crawler found that 512,701 of the top 1 million sites had internal site search. We used this crawler to visit the Tranco top one million websites and analyzed search term leakage across three vectors: URL query parameters, payloads, and the Referer HTTP header. We developed a methodology for identifying and interacting with search components, which we implemented on top of an instrumented headless browser. In this paper, we measure the various ways by which search terms are sent to third parties when a user submits a search query. Search terms on these sites may contain sensitive information such as location, medical information, or sexual preferences when further coupled with a user’s IP address or a browser’s user agent string, this information can become very specific, and in some cases possibly identifying. Internal site search is an integral part of how users navigate modern sites, from restaurant reservations to house hunting to searching for medical solutions. To fix this problem, we discuss how services can apply the Referrer Policy correctly to avoid these incidents, as well as other server and client side countermeasures. In the second case, one service correctly implements an appropriate Referrer Policy, but some web browsers do not obey it, causing links clicked through them to leak their HTTP Referers. In the first case, six services leak their referrers because they do not implement a strict enough and up-to-date policy. We identify two root causes of these issues, both having to do with an incorrect application of the Referrer Policy, a countermeasure designed to restrict how HTTP Referers are shared with third parties. We present a study of 21 online collaboration services and show that seven of them are vulnerable to this kind of secret information disclosure caused by the improper handling of embedded links and HTTP Referers. Specifically, if a user clicks on a link embedded into a file hosted on an OCS, the HTTP Referer contained in the resulting HTTP request might leak the secret URL. In this paper, we show that the secret location of OCS files can be leaked by the improper handling of links embedded in these files. The security of this secret link approach relies on the fact that only those who know the location of the secret resource (i.e., its URL) can access it. Documents on these services are frequently shared via secret links, which allows easy collaboration between different users. Online collaboration services (OCS) are appealing since they provide ease of access to resources and the ability to collaborate on shared files.

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